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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
GILBERTO SUAREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880309-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and 
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at 
IV, 1-6. Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's 
Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Suarez asserts that his jury was selected contrary to 
the Constitution of Utah and the Jury Selection and Service Act. He 
further maintains that these violations and other practical 
considerations demonstrate prejudice occurred to his substantial 
rights demanding a new trial. 
The trial court's failure to excuse juror Wolford for 
cause was reversible error. The State's distortion of the facts 
regarding this issue must be rejected and the error corrected by 
ordering a new trial. 
The State failed to present a sufficient quantum of 
evidence to support the conviction of Mr. Suarez. Reversal of that 
conviction is therefore required. The State's conduct of supplying 
jurors with information not in evidence and offering personal 
beliefs about the case also requires reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN UTILIZING JURORS PREVIOUSLY EXCUSED FROM 
ANOTHER COURT'S VOIR DIRE PROCESS OF THAT SAME DAY 
OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL. 
The State suggests that Appellant's reliance on the jury 
list from the Judge Russon trial, Addendum A of the opening brief, 
is of questionable utility because the document was not made part of 
the record. Brief of Respondent at 9 n.4. 
On the contrary, the juror list from the Russon court was 
stipulated to be part of the record by the parties on the suggestion 
of the trial court. R. 109 at 12-13. Though not intended as an 
exhibit for the jury, the list was recognized as part of the record 
so that Mr. Suarez might preserve his issue for appeal. Id. 
Attaching the certified copy of the list as an addendum once the 
parties and trial court have already agreed that it should be part 
of the record violates no principle of law and further excuses it 
from the premise briefly mentioned in Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 
121, 123 (Utah 1986), which is cited by the State. Brief of 
Respondent at 9 n.4. 
In addition, even if the attachment of Addendum A was 
somehow erroneous, the record wholly substantiates that thirteen of 
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the twenty-two jurors were rejected or unused participants from the 
Judge Russon voir dire. After declaring a mistrial with the first 
jury panel, the trial court informed counsel that a new jury would 
be impaneled and the trial begun anew, R. 108 at 5. Apparently, 
discussions were then held off the record where the court talked 
about utilizing jurors excused from other courts1 voir dire 
processes to formulate the new panel. R. 109 at 8-9. Mr. Suarez 
did not object to such a jury panel before the lunch break; but 
immediately after lunch and before the panel was seated, Mr. Suarez 
did object to utilizing the rejected and unused jurors as the 
majority of this new panel. R. 109 at 3. The discussion which 
followed the arguments of counsel implies that all involved accepted 
the premise that thirteen of the twenty-two jurors were from the 
Russon panel. R. 109 at 3-13. Moreover, the record reflects the 
explicit acceptance of that fact: 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, how am I, when the jury clerk 
sends me this list telling me that these 
twenty-two names are pre-qualified jurors, how am 
I to determine that these jurors have been 
selected in any other process than through the 
jury clerk sending them to me? 
MS. REMAL [defense counsel]: Well, because your 
clerk just questioned them and found out, in fact, 
thirteen of them came from Judge Russon's court. 
R. 109 at 8. After this statement, the record demonstrates that the 
parties accepted as fact that the thirteen jurors were from the 
Russon voir dire. See generally R. 109 at 12-13. 
In short, no doubt should exist that thirteen of the 
twenty-two panelists had prior jury service in Judge Russon's 
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courtroom the very same day that they were impaneled as part of the 
Suarez jury panel. 
The State next hints that Mr. Suarez may have waived any 
challenge to the panel when he passed the jurors for cause (Brief of 
Respondent at 9) and when he failed to use all of his available 
peremptory challenges to remove the Judge Russon jurors.1 Brief of 
Respondent at 14 n.7. The record in this case demonstrates an 
objection to the second panel of jurors which included the thirteen 
rejected jurors from the Judge Russon court; the record similarly 
demonstrates that the trial court was aware of that objection and 
took steps to see that the issue was preserved for appellate 
purposes. R. 109 at 3-13. 
While alleging that Mr. Suarez did not utilize all his 
peremptory challenges to remove the Russon jurors, the State fails 
to support why that action would have been necessary regarding this 
issue. Neither Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure nor 
case law requires that a challenge to the panel—and in this case, 
the larger portion of the panel—be reinforced by exercising 
peremptory challenges to correct the error. Apparently, the State 
confuses this issue with the issue of the challenges for cause of an 
individual juror which Mr. Suarez advances at Point II of his 
1 Inasmuch as the State treated both Point I and Point II 
of Mr. Suarez's opening brief in a factual rendition in Point I of 
its argument, some confusion exists as to which issue the State is 
challenging with these claims. 
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opening brief and this brief.2 
Mr. Suarez maintains that only nine members of his panel 
were selected in conformity with statutory requirements. One of 
them was excused for cause, three were peremptorily challenged by 
the State, two sat on the jury, and two others were eliminated 
mathematically (inasmuch as they were at the end of the list and 
would not be reached). Compare R. 88-89 with Addendum A of 
Appellant's opening brief. The State's contention that Mr. Suarez 
waives this claim because he used a peremptory challenge on one of 
the nine properly selected jurors rather than a tainted juror 
negates the concept of peremptory challenges requiring Mr. Suarez to 
forego attempting to obtain his perception of an impartial jury in 
favor of a restrictive obligation to preserve a blanket objection to 
the panel for appeal purposes. The law simply does not require that 
Mr. Suarez so subjugate his constitutional right to an impartial 
jury. 
At Point IB and IC of Respondent's Brief, the State 
contends that neither error nor prejudice occurred in the jury 
selection process of this case. The State addresses the 
constitutional question of whether the selection process violated 
fair cross-section principles by advocating that the Jury Selection 
2
 Case law requires that a challenge for cause of an 
individual juror which is erroneously denied by the trial court must 
be corrected by a peremptory challenge, if available, for prejudice 
to be established and the issue preserved for appeal. See Point II, 
infra. The State confuses the law and these issues when attempting 
to extend that principle to the issue of whether the venire was 
properly selected. 
and Service Act (the "Act") contains permissive language and in 
general supports the trial court's behavior. Brief of Respondent at 
18-19. Subsection (4) of Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13 contains the 
permissive language relied on by the State. It reads: 
(4) If there is an unanticipated shortage of 
available jurors drawn from a qualified jury 
wheel, the court may require the clerk of the 
court to summon a sufficient number of trial 
jurors selected at random by the court from the 
qualified jury wheel. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-13(4) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added). The 
State urges that the trial court behaved appropriately when 
"look[ing] to the reason, spirit and sense of the legislation, as 
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute 
dealing with this subject." Brief of Respondent at 18-19, 19 n.13 
(citing Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 191 
P.2d 612 (Utah 1948)). 
Mr. Suarez respectfully disagrees. While admitting the 
permissive word "may" is contained in the statute, Mr. Suarez 
insists that a reading of the entire statute, "in reason, spirit and 
sense of the legislation," reveals that no other method of filling a 
shortage of jurors is suggested or statutorily available,, 
Mr. Suarez contends the permissive "may" of the statute 
contemplates only two options. Either the court may request a 
sufficient number of trial jurors selected at random from the 
qualified jury wheel to meet the shortage or the court may dismiss 
the panel for want of adequate numbers—a partial reason for 
dismissing the first jury panel in this case (R. 108 at 5)—and 
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start over with a new panel necessarily from jurors selected at 
random from the qualified jury wheel. The trial court's selection 
process was contrary to the only two permissible statutory options. 
Even the prosecutor in this case recognized that the 
proper selection process was not followed. R. 109 at 9-11. The 
prosecutor's comment and the court's eventual ruling disclose that 
this knowing violation of the statute was overlooked because of a 
belief that the error might not rise to constitutional dimensions; 
therefore, the violation of the Act was tolerated in favor of 
courtroom scheduling. R. 109 at 5, 10-13. As the Utah Constitution 
guarantees the right of an impartial jury (Article I, Section 12, 
Constitution of Utah) and the Act interprets that right to include a 
jury venire randomly selected from a fair cross-section of the 
population (§78-46-2)3, the violation of the Act did reach 
constitutional dimensions and did prejudice Mr. Suarez.4 
In State v. Poe, 471 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court found a violation of the Act but failed to find 
prejudice because none of the tainted jurors took part in the 
3
 §78-46-2 states in part: 
78-46-2. Jurors selected from random cross 
section— 
It is the policy of this state that persons 
selected for jury service be selected at random 
from a fair cross section of the population of the 
area served by the court . . . 
4
 Mr. Suarez notes for clarification that the 
constitutional violation encompasses both the right to an impartial 
jury and the right to due process as assured him by both the State 
and federal constitutions. 
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deliberations. In this case, six of the eight jurors who 
deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty against Mr. Suarez were 
from the thirteen tainted jurors obtained in violation of the Act. 
Compare R. 88-89 with Addendum A of Appellant's opening brief. 
Accordingly, the .prejudice absent in Poe appears in this case and 
warrants reversal of his conviction. 
To the contrary, the State relies on Foster v. State, 499 
A.2d 1236 (Md. 1985), for the proposition that jurors may be 
"recycled." Brief of Respondent at 24. That reliance is 
misplaced. The Maryland Court so ruled because the defense accepted 
the jury without qualification and because Maryland statutes 
authorized the behavior. Id. at 1250. Because Mr. Suarez objected 
to the recycled jurors in his case and because no Utah statute 
expressly allows that procedure, neither rationale is present in 
this case and Foster v. State is without persuasive effect. 
Besides the constitutional and statutory arguments 
presented by Mr. Suarez in his opening brief, he also articulated 
several pragmatic reasons why this Court should find prejudicial 
error in the method utilized to obtain his jury panel. Mr. Suarez 
complains that prior jury service of such recentness as that 
involved by the thirteen jurors in this case too easily facilitates 
a juror's desire to either sit or not sit on the case by conforming 
voir dire answers to those which achieved the desired results in the 
prior experience. Brief of Appellant at 12. The State responds to 
this argument by citing to the additional argument of Mr. Suarez 
where he asserts that the trial court in essence had intimidated 
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veniremen from freely responding to particular questions. Brief of 
Respondent at 15 and 15 n.8. This position by the State 
misperceives the arguments of Mr. Suarez, sanctions the trial 
court's treatment of jurors, and again confuses the two separate 
issues he urges, Point I and Point II of his briefs. 
For clarification, Mr. Suarez complains that when jurors 
sit through two voir dires on the same day, they acquire an 
awareness of responses which may assist in either sitting or not 
sitting on the jury. This ability to learn responses is very 
distinct from Mr. Suarez's later complaint that the trial judge in 
this case conducted voir dire in such a manner as to chill the 
responses of the jurors. Mr. Suarez presents the evidence of the 
trial court's curt treatment of prospective jurors in this case not 
for the proposition that jurors learned from earlier responses but 
rather to support or explain an issue integral to the second point 
of his opening brief, that juror Wolford may not have repeated the 
earlier assertion during the Judge Russon voir dire for fear of 
reprisal. See Point II, infra. 
Ironically, the State attempts to defeat one claim of 
error by citing to and endorsing a second and distinct claim of 
error. While Mr. Suarez doubts that the State intended to concede 
error in this manner, he urges that the State's acceptance of the 
trial court's method of voir dire in this case is misplaced. He 
further urges that this Court should not condone the trial court's 
treatment of the jurors in this case inasmuch as the voir dire of 
the prospective jurors is far from textbook. 
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Finally, Mr. Suarez continues to maintain that he was 
prejudiced by the improper jury selection method as demonstrated by 
the facts presented in Point II of his briefs. A juror's response 
in the first voir dire which justified an excusal for cause because 
of his inability to be impartial similarly justified an excusal for 
cause from the second panel as well.5 The trial court's failure to 
remove that juror for cause from Mr. Suarez's panel required the use 
of a peremptory challenge to correct the error and prejudiced 
Mr. Suarez's right to a fair trial. See discussion at Point II 
infra and at Point II of Appellant's opening brief. 
In summary, Mr. Suarez maintains that the thirteen 
veniremen on his panel from the Judge Russon voir dire were selected 
contrary to constitutional and statutory provisions. Mr. Suarez 
maintains that because six of those thirteen actually sat as jurors 
in this case, and because he had to exercise a peremptory challenge 
5 The State attempts to refute this issue by claiming the 
police officer testimony in this case was "in favor of the 
defendant" and that "[p]olice officer testimony was hardly crucial 
to the State's case." Brief of Respondent at 16-17. That assertion 
should be rejected as factually incorrect and legally irrelevant. 
While important information was brought out on cross-examination of 
Officer Housley which supports Mr. Suarez's position on appeal 
(R. 110 at 7-11; Brief of Appellant at 24-25? Brief of Respondent at 
16-17), three different police officers testified for the State as 
witnesses against Mr. Suarez. R. 110 at 3, 12, 16. The State's 
attempt to reduce the role and influence of the officers on the jury 
(Brief of Respondent at 16-17 n.10) cannot be given serious 
attention. See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 100 (Utah App. 1987) 
(Billings, J., dissenting opinion), cert, granted, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, 4 (Jan. 3, 1989). More importantly, the proper focus of this 
inquiry is not factual but rather is a legal question of whether the 
trial court should have excused a juror for cause who had expressed 
an inability to be impartial. See Point II of Appellant's opening 
brief. 
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to remove one of the thirteen which the trial court should have 
excused for cause, prejudice inhered demanding reversal of his 
conviction and a new trial ordered. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT 
MR. SUAREZfS CHALLENGE OF A JUROR FOR CAUSE 
REQUIRING HIM TO USE A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
The State misperceives the record pertaining to this 
issue when claiming that Mr. Suarez did not challenge juror Wolford 
for cause until after the jury was empaneled. Brief of Respondent 
at 10-11. Such an argument demonstrates the State's failure to 
grasp the realities of trial and this record. The State miscontrues 
the facts of this case when it states: 
It appears from the comments of defense 
counsel that she discovered this information [that 
Mr. Wolford was excused for cause during the first 
voir dire because he stated that he believed 
police officers because they were police officers 
and that they were right 95% of the time] during 
lunch on the first day of trial, and removed Juror 
Wolford with a peremptory challenge without 
explaining the contents of the forthcoming 
affidavit because the Bergeson affidavit was not 
available because Ms. Bergeson was busy in her own 
trial. Although defendant was allowed to submit 
written questions prior to the voir dire, and was 
asked for additional questions during the voir 
dire, he did not seek to reveal the facts 
concerning Juror Wolford until after the jury was 
empaneled. 
Defendant waited until the close of the 
State's case-in-chief to present the Bergeson 
affidavit, the contents of which he was aware of 
prior to making his initial objection to the 
second panel of jurors. 
Brief of Respondent at 10-11 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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Even a cursory reading of the State's Appendix A (taken from R. 110 
at 25-28) reveals the distortion in the State's characterization of 
the record. 
The record reveals that following voir dire, a discussion 
occurred between court and counsel at the bench; the details of that 
discussion were not recorded. R. 112 at 32. At the conclusion of 
the presentation of evidence the following morning, counsel, 
consistent with common practice of the district court judges,6 made 
motions out of the presence of the jury. Among the motions, counsel 
placed on the record her objection to the denial of her challenge of 
Mr. Wolford for cause including the substance of the Bergeson 
affidavit. R. 110 at 25-27. She stated: 
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, in addition, I 
have the matter left over from yesterday—that you 
indicated I could put on the record. Would you 
like me to do that now? 
JUDGE YOUNG: You may. 
R. 110 at 25. 
A minute entry by the court clerk reflects that the 
motion counsel made regarding juror Wolford was an objection to the 
6 While the State emphasizes that defense counsel did not 
discuss this topic on the record until after the State rested, an 
examination of the overall events reveals that occasion to be the 
first "real" opportunity for defense counsel to obtain the benefit 
of the record. The jury was not selected until the afternoon of day 
one, and following the first two witnesses for the State, no time 
was provided for counsel to use the record. R. 21; R. 109 at 89-90; 
R. 110 at 27. Day two of trial followed the trial court's usual 
Friday morning criminal calendar, undoubtedly preventing the use of 
the record prior to the scheduled start. R. 109 at 90. 
Accordingly, when the State finished with its evidence just prior to 
the lunch break of day two was the first real opportunity for 
counsel to place her objection on the record. R. 110 at 23-24. 
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court's earlier ruling denying the requested excusal for cause. 
That minute entry reads as follows: 
Comes now counsel for defendant and makes a motion 
objecting to the Courts ruling regarding the 
proposed Juror Henry Wolford not being excused for 
cause by the Court. The Court denies defendants 
motion. 
R. 22-23. Analytically, one does not make a motion objecting to a 
ruling unless there exists a ruling to object to. Accordingly, the 
trial court necessarily must have already heard and denied the 
challenge for cause for counsel to object to that ruling. 
Furthermore, all terms used by defense counsel in her 
motion are in past tense demanding the inference that she is 
restating the earlier motion and what occurred then and there. 
R. 110 at 25-28. Any confusion on that point is easily clarified by 
her lead-in remarks cited above. Other portions of her motion 
(attached at Addendum C in this brief) also demonstrate that counsel 
was not belatedly objecting or moving to excuse Mr. Wolford for 
cause; rather, she was placing on the record what was discussed at 
side bar after voir dire and before the peremptory challenges were 
taken. See R. 112 at 32. In short, court and counsel followed the 
common practice of the district court to handle challenges for cause 
at side bar providing counsel with the opportunity of placing any 
objections on the record at a later time. 
Additionally, Mr. Suarez's characterization of the record 
is supported by noting the sequence of events following defense 
counsel's use of the record to preserve for appeal her earlier 
challenge for cause. Notably, the trial judge did not dispute 
- 13 -
defense counsel's claim to the earlier challenge for cause nor was 
it necessary for the court to call upon the prosecutor for his 
position on the matter. The court merely indicated on the record 
why he had denied the motion at that time. 
The State alludes to another occurrence which supports 
that challenges for cause took place at the side bar when it 
erroneously states, "Defendant passed for cause another juror who 
seemed to be inclined to believe police officer testimony." Brief 
of Respondent at 17 (citation omitted). In an accompanying 
footnote, the State then acknowledges that this juror was excused 
for cause despite the fact that "[tjhere is no record explaining the 
court's rationale in excusing Ms. Lloyd." Brief of Respondent at 17 
n.ll. There is no such record because challenges for cause were 
handled at the side bar conference indicated in the record just 
prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges. R. 112 at 32 
("whereupon a discussion between court and counsel was held at the 
bench, after which, the following proceedings were had"—then 
indicating peremptory challenges were exercised). Notably, 
peremptory challenges cannot be exercised until challenges for cause 
are made. See Rule 18(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Therefore, the only possible time to have conducted the challenges 
for cause was during that side bar conference held ideally between 
the completion of voir dire and the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, thus substantiating Mr. Suarez's position that what 
occurs on the record (R. 110 at 25-27) is not the actual motion as 
contended by the State but is counsel recording that earlier 
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objection to preserve this issue for appeal. The State's 
misperception of the events should not be allowed to prohibit review 
of this issue. 
Finally, an analogous use of the record in this case was 
relied on by the State to support its rendition of the facts. The 
State claims that Mr. Suarez did not initially object to the trial 
court's proposal that a second jury panel could be gathered in part 
from the left over jurors from other courtrooms of that same 
morning. However, examining the record reveals no indication that 
the court and counsel even discussed the matter that morning. That 
discussion becomes evident only when reading the record of that 
afternoon when the court references an off-the-record discussion 
occurring after the morning session was completed. Compare R. 108 
at 4-6 with R. 109 at 8-9. Again, the State's apparent 
unfamiliarity with common practices of the district court and the 
use of the record must not preclude this court from reaching the 
issue now presented. 
The State next relies on State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639 
(Utah 1988), to support the proposition that failure to timely 
request an excusal for cause waives that issue for appellate 
review. Brief of Respondent at 12-13. State v. Moton, however, is 
inapposite to the facts in this case as explained above; here 
counsel did make a contemporaneous objection and only later placed 
it on the record. R. 110 at 25-27. Therefore, the controlling line 
of cases, as recognized by State v. Moton and cited in the State's 
brief, includes State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984); 
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State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981); and other such cases 
cited in Appellant's opening brief at 14-21. 
Those cases hold that it is prejudicial error to force an 
accused to remove by peremptory challenge that which the trial court 
had improperly failed to remove on the challenge for cause. 
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980). This holding was 
very recently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Jan. 31, 1989), stating that 
prejudicial error occurs "where a peremptory challenge is used to 
remove a prospective juror who should have been excused for cause." 
Id. at 6 (citing State v Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981).7 
The trial court misapplied the law in this case when it 
ruled that because Mr. Wolford was removed by peremptory challenge 
and was not a participant in the case, no prejudice could have 
occurred to Mr. Suarez. R. 110 at 27. This ruling by the court is 
contrary to the law cited above and referenced in the Brief of 
Appellant at pages 14-21. Accordingly, reversal of Mr. Suarez's 
conviction is required. 
Importantly, the State does not seriously challenge the 
substantive issue of whether Mr. Wolford should have been excused 
for cause (see footnote 5, supra), choosing instead to assert a 
7 Inasmuch as State v. Gardner was authored well after 
the United States Supreme Court opinion of Ross v. Oklahoma, 101 
L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), Mr. Suarez retracts his concern over the effect 
that ruling may have on the long-standing Utah position. He urges 
State v. Gardner indicates the Utah Supreme Court's continued 
adherence to the proposition that the use of peremptory challenges 
to correct erroneous denials of challenges for cause results in 
reversible error. 
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waiver defense not supported by the record. With the record now 
clarified, Mr. Suarez insists that Mr. Wolford should have been 
excused for cause. Brief of Appellant at 12-21. Because the trial 
court erroneously denied the challenge of Mr. Wolford for cause, 
Mr. Suarez utilized a peremptory challenge to correct that error. 
R. 88-89. Accordingly, the law requires that this Court find that 
prejudice occurred to Mr. Suarez and reverse the conviction against 
him. 
POINT III. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST 
MR. SUAREZ FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 
Mr. Suarez relies on the argument outlined in his opening 
brief to establish insufficient evidence existed to support his 
conviction. Brief of Appellant at 21-30. He responds briefly, 
however, to several of the contentions advanced by the State to the 
contrary. See Point II, Brief of Respondent at 24-33. 
Urging rejection of Mr. Suarez's claim of self-defense, 
the State cites State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701 (Utah 1985). Brief of 
Respondent at 25-26. State v. Buel, however, is irreconcilable with 
the present case. By the State's own admission, the defendant in 
State v. Buel possessed a dangerous weapon and was convicted on that 
charge as well as the charge of Aggravated Assault. _Id. In this 
case, a significant point insisted on by Mr. Suarez is that no 
dangerous weapon—the alleged knife urged by the prosecutor—was 
ever seen by anyone, and no such weapon was ever recovered or 
introduced into evidence. 
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In State v, Buel, the defendant had taunted the victim 
and had expressed a desire to kill the victim, and considerable 
other evidence contradicted the self-defense claim. Nothing of this 
sort occurred in the case at bar. Mr. Suarez did not even know the 
victim prior to the night in question and only reacted to the 
victim's aggressive entrance into his home. R. 110 at 38-41, 
51-53. Moreover, Mr. Suarez's version of the facts was corroborated 
by testimony taken at the hospital from the victim within a short 
time after the incident. R. 110 at 10-11. Only later did the 
victim change his story to a less intrusive entrance, although still 
an uninvited and unlawful entrance. R. 109 at 28-65. 
As State v. Buel is incompatible factually with this 
case, any reliance thereon is misplaced. 
At trial, the prosecutor, through argument, submitted 
into evidence that a knife was used, that the description of the 
injury was consistent with a knife based on his personal experience, 
and that he believed it to be a knife. Brief of Appellant at 
26-30. The State defends this misconduct of the prosecutor by 
claiming waiver and by urging that the statements of counsel are not 
evidence. Brief of Respondent at 32-33. The State's contentions 
should be rejected. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court noted, "Nothing in 
[Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence] precludes taking notice of 
plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not 
brought to the attention of the court." State v. Eldredge, 101 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15, 18 (Feb. 1, 1989). Mr. Suarez accordingly urges that 
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the statements of the prosecutor to the jurors, particularly that he 
believed that Mr. Suarez used a knife, meet both prongs of this 
state's body of law on prosecutorial misconduct. See Point IIIB of 
Appellant's opening brief (citing State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1983); State v. Valdez, 531 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973)). 
In agreement, the United States Supreme Court recently 
opined: 
The line separating acceptable from improper 
advocacy is not easily drawn; there is often a 
gray zone. Prosecutors sometimes breach their 
duty to refrain from overzealous conduct by 
commenting on the defendant's guilt and offering 
unsolicited views on the evidence. 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 6 (1985). In criticizing the 
Young prosecutor for his behavior, the Court further noted: 
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to 
express his or her personal opinion as to the 
truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or 
the guilt of the defendant. 
Id. (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (2d ed. 
1980)). The Young Court explained that when prosecutors express 
personal opinions on the evidence and/or guilt of the accused, such 
action "may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment 
rather than its own view of the evidence." Id. at 18 (citing 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935)). 
The Court found the prosecutor's comments in Young to be 
error, albeit harmless due to the defense argument which invited the 
error. _I_d at 22. Mr. Suarez asserts that on the facts of his case, 
the prosecutor's comments were inappropriate and likely influenced 
the jury's decision such that error occurred here also. He insists 
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that because of the closeness of the case, the error affected the 
outcome and prejudiced his fundamental right to a fair trial. That 
error mandates that his conviction be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Gilberto 
Suarez requests that this Court review the arguments contained in 
his opening brief and this brief and order that either the charge 
against him be dismissed or the conviction be vacated and a new 
trial ordered. / 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
{RLMED} 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) CRIMINAL NO. CR-88-307 
-VS- ) TRIAL 
GILBERTO D. SUAREZ, ) VOLUME I I 
DEFENDANT. ) 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON FRIDAY, THE LST DAY 
OF APRIL, 1988, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:05 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
> —•« !i ? U 
FILED IN
 C L E R K . S 
fe
" Lake County Utah 
S EP 11938 
O^p 8 1988 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE COURT Or Af J-CALS 
1 CAUSED THAT WOUND BECAUSE NOBODY SAW ANY SORT OF WEAPON 
2 AND THAT'S BEEN THE TESTIMONY THUS FAR AS I'VE UNDERSTOOD 
3 IT. 
4
 IT SEEMS TO ME THAT SERIOUS BODILY INJURY UNDER 
5 THE DEFINITION IS SOMETHING THAT REQUIRES MORE THAN HAS 
* BEEN SHOWN THUS FAR BY THE PROSECUTION. 
7
 THE DEFINTION OF SERIOUS BODILY INJURY IS THAT 
8 IT MEANS BODILY INJURY THAT CREATES OR CAUSES SERIOUS 
9 PERMANENT DISFIGUREMENT, PROTRACTED LOSS OR IMPAIRMENT OF 
10 THE FUNCTION OF ANY BODILY MEMBER OR ORGAN, OR CREATES A 
11 SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF DEATH. 
12 MY RECOLLECTION OF THE TESTIMONY IS THAT WE HAVE 
13 NOT HAD ANY EVIDENCE THAT ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
14 OF ANY OF THOSE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES. AND IN ADDITION, 
15 AS I'VE INDICATED, THERE'S BEEN NO TESTIMONY ABOUT WHAT 
16 CAUSED THAT SO I DON'T THINK THERE'S BEEN AN ESTABLISHMENT 
l"7 THAT A DEADLY WEAPON HAS BEEN USED. 
I8 YOUR HONOR, IN ADDITION, I HAVE THE MATTER--
«M 
19 THIS IS LEFT OVER FROM YESTERDAY--THAT YOU INDICATED 1 COULD 
2 0
 PUT ON THE RECORD. WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO DO THAT NOW? 
21 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY. 
22 MISS REMAL: THAT IS IN REGARD TO MY REQUEST 
23 TO EXCUSE FOR CAUSE, MR. HARRY WOLFORD FROM OUR JURY PANEL. 
Z 4
 I DID ULTIMATELY USE A PREEMPTORY CHALLENGE TO EXCUSE HIM 
2 5
 SO HE IS NOT A MEMBER OF OUR JURY AS IMPANELED. 
25 
r 
B R O A C H THE BfcNCV 
5 
6 
10 
A5 1 INDICATED 
jL*;R IUJ'"i * ML F R ' * ) b b R U S 5 ' fc 0UC ' * . 
^ '
 r
 RERG L SON 
N C J L N 
DG 
' - P - 3 L N 
J M i n A i -
-P> f M THf- ,. 
P E O P L : A H O 
B L R fa b S 0 ! i 
,R "RO- *' 
< i r iA 
-- Z fJ L t O b b i G ! : t- K ' a ' <E B r . I b V b ; -< L IC 
20 
E V L - G A V t A I C E O h
L
 I C E R ' S r b \ ' i ^ C \ v VO~>: wMG 1 -
23 
25 
A R O I I T M P 
i ^ A - c : Ml bERGESON AN. 
u I i M A i n*iiCK - ^ - ^ 
3 p U| A Q T H F I T kT 
\ •_-* , - • „ L ' JN« • ~ 
•Mf -RS "A ,p 
L < : / J S - ? . AND FOR 
1
 THAT REASON I MOVED TO EXCUSE HIM FOR CAUSE, ALTHOUGH, AT 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
14 
15 
IS 
19 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THAT TIME DID NOT HAVE THE AFFIDAVIT BECAUSE MISS BERGESON 
WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF HER TRIAL AT THAT POINT. 
SO I DO PUT THAT ON THE RECORD BECAUSE WE DIDN'T 
HAVE A CHANCE TO DO THAT YESTERDAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOUR MOTION IN RELATION TO THE 
EXCUSING OF MR. WOLFORD FOR CAUSE IS DENIED AND THE COURT 
FINDS THAT CERTAINLY MR. WOLFORD IS NOT EVEN A PARTICIPANT 
IN THIS JURY, AND THE FACT HE MAY HAVE MADE THOSE COMMENTS 
IN JUDGE RUSSON'S COURT, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
11
 I EARLIER IN THE DAY AFTER HAVING HEARD THE EXPLANATIONS OF 
12 JUDGE RUSSON'S IN QUALIFYING THE JURY, AFTER THIS COURT 
13 J IN QUALIFYING THE JURY, HE MAY WELL HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE 
RESPONSES HE GAVE EARLIER AND THUS ELECTED NOT TO GIVE HIM 
LATER. AND SO IN RELATION TO THE ISSUE OF MR. WOLFORD THE 
16
 I COURT DENIES ANY CLAIM YOU HAVE TO PREJUDICE, AND CERTAINLY, 
1 7
 I MR. WOLFORD IS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THIS JURY AND THUS YOUR 
UTILIZING A PREEMPTORY CHALLENGE ON HIM TO EXCLUDE HIM CURED 
ANY DEFAULT THAT YOU WOULD HAVE FOUND IN RELATION TO MR. 
WOLFORD. 
21
 DO YOU DESIRE TO ARGUE, MR. BOWN, IN RELATION 
TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS? 
MR. BOWN: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. I THINK 
THE TEST AT THIS POINT IS THIS EVIDENCE THE JURY WOULD WILL-
FULLY BELIEVE A KNIFE WAS USED AND, I THINK THAT ALTHOUGH 
27 
